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Agricultural Contracting and
the Scale of Production
Nigel Key
This study presents evidence that contracting is positively associated with the scale of production for
six major U.S. agricultural commodities. Specifically, contract producers tend to operate at a larger
scale than do independent producers, and the likelihood of an operation contracting increases with
its scale. This relationship is strongest in the cattle and hog sectors, where it persists even among
large commercial operations. Six theoretical explanations for the observed correlation between scale
and contracting are proposed, including imperfect capital markets, contractor transaction costs, input
leverage, grower risk aversion, asset specificity, and technological change. Information from five
annual national surveys is used to examine the validity of three of the proposed mechanisms.
Key Words: marketing contracts, production contracts, risk, scale of production, transaction costs
In recent years there has been a substantial increase
in the concentration of agricultural production in
the United States—the size of farms and ranches
has grown while the number of operations has
declined. For example, based on Census of Agricul-
ture data, between 1992 and 1997, the number of
farms accounting for 75% of sales declined by 22%,
while the average farm size for this group increased
8.8% [U.S. Department of Agriculture/National
Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA/NASS),
1992 and 1997 census years)]. This consolidation
of production has coincided with an increase in the
use of marketing and production contracts. Market-
ing contracts govern the terms of sale of a commod-
ity by specifying the price (or pricing mechanism),
quantity to be delivered, and time of delivery.
Production contracts contain agreements governing
the provision of inputs by the contractor in exchange
for a marketing arrangement. Production contracts
often assign legal ownership of the commodity to
the contractor. Marketing and production contracts
may take a variety of forms: some may bind growers
to particular management practices or specify that
growers meet certain quality standards. USDA data
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show that the share of agricultural production in the
United States under contract increased at an aver-
age rate of 3% per year between 1991 and 2002,
with production and marketing contracts growing at
about 4% and 2% per year, respectively [USDA/
Economic Research Service (ERS)]. In 2002, 37%
of the value of all agricultural production was pro-
duced under contract.
Of the major commodities in the last decade, the
hog sector has probably experienced both the
greatest consolidation of production and increase in
the use of contracts. Between 1994 and 1999, the
number of U.S. hog farms fell by more than 50%,
from over 200,000 to less than 100,000, while the
hog inventory remained relatively stable (USDA/
NASS, 1995S1999). During the same six-year per-
iod, farms with at least 2,000 head increased their
share of total swine inventory from 37% to 81%.
Similarly, there was rapid growth among very large
operations: operations producing at least 50,000
head increased their share of total hogs marketed
from 17% in 1994 to 37% in 1997 to 51% in 2000
(Lawrence and Grimes, 2001). The last decade also
saw a rapid increase in contracting, with the share
of hog production under contract increasing from
about 18% in 1990, to about 28% in 1995, to almost
60% in 2000 (USDA/ERS).
The simultaneous increase in the scale of agricul-
tural production and the incidence of contracting
suggests these two phenomena could be related. The
first objective of this study is to identify whether
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there is a positive correlation between the scale of
production and the use of contracts. Using five
pooled annual national surveys of the agricultural
sector, the findings reveal contracting is associated
with a larger scale of the production for all of the
major commodities for which information is avail-
able. That is, larger-scale producers are more likely
to use contracts, and contract producers operate on
a larger scale, on average, than do independent pro-
ducers. This relationship also holds for cattle, hogs,
corn, and soybeans even when we consider only
those producers with a value of production of at
least $250,000.
The second objective of this analysis is to pre-
sent a comprehensive set of theoretical explanations
for the observed relationship between contracting
and scale. Six possible mechanisms are considered
based on imperfect financial markets, transaction
costs, agency theory, and technological change.
First, it is shown that contracts may result in greater
borrowing and scale if contracts shift profit risk
away from farmers in the context of imperfect finan-
cial markets. This occurs because lenders respond
to the risk-return tradeoff between independent and
contract hog production by lending at lower rates to
contract producers. Second, it is argued that fixed
transaction costs associated with contracting may
induce contractors to contract with larger-scale
operators. Third, it is demonstrated that, in the
context of limited access to credit, contract growers
can achieve a greater scale of production than inde-
pendent growers because contractors provide many
inputs, which reduces farmers’ financing needs.
Three additional mechanisms are also briefly
discussed through which contracting can result in
larger scale: by providing income insurance which
induces a risk-averse grower to exert more effort;
by encouraging greater investment in productive
specific assets which reduces the farmer’s risk of
hold-up; and by contributing to scale-enhancing
technological change.
The final objective of this study is to use survey
data to shed light on the validity of the theories. With
the data at our disposal, we are able to examine three
of the six proposed mechanisms. The empirical
approach adopted here is to compare predictions
from the theoretical models with observations from
a large pooled cross-sectional survey. Survey evi-
dence which contradicts the prediction of a theory
casts doubt on the validity of that theory. Evidence
which is consistent with a theory’s predictions
implies the validity of the theory cannot be ruled
out. This empirical approach does not provide
statistical “tests” of the mechanisms, but does offer
useful information about their validity.
1
Empirical Relationships
To examine the relationship between scale of pro-
duction and contracting, data are pooled from five
annual Agricultural Resource Management Surveys
(ARMS) conducted by the USDA in the years
1996S2000. Each year the USDA surveyed approxi-
mately 10,000 farmers, resulting in a total of 53,669
observations in the pooled cross-section. In this
study, those commodities are examined for which
at least 100 farmers reported contracting in every
year of the survey: cattle, hogs, corn, soybeans,
wheat, and cotton.
2
There are several possible ways to illustrate the
relationship between contracting and scale of pro-
duction. Table 1 compares the enterprise value of
production for contract and independent operations
for the six commodities that are produced either
independently or under contract.
3 The table also
presents information available after 1998 for two
sub-categories of the livestock commodities: feeder
and finished (market). A commodity is defined as
produced under contract by an operation if more
than 50% of the enterprise value of production of
the commodity is sold under contract. Information
about assets and borrowing is observed at the farm,
rather than the enterprise level. To compare inde-
pendent and contract producers, it is necessary to
categorize a farm as producing under contract or in-
dependently. The 50% cutoff provides a logical, if
somewhat arbitrary, way of making this distinction.
1  There are challenging issues of identification that cannot be readily
addressed with the pooled cross-sectional data at our disposal. For
example, some of the proposed theories imply different levels of debt and
value of production relative to net worth for contract and independent
producers. The variables of interest—value of production and debt—are
simultaneously determined with the decision to contract, and a credible
instrument with which to identify these endogenous variables is not avail-
able. Consequently, it is not possible to obtain unbiased estimates of the
effect of the organizational structure (contracting) on scale or debt, nor
is it possible to disentangle the individual contributions of the competing
theories.
2  Poultry and sugar beet production are excluded from the study be-
cause these commodities are produced almost exclusively under contract,
ruling out a comparison to independent production. In addition, the
product categories “fruits” and “vegetables” are excluded because these
categories are considered too heterogeneous to make valid comparisons
across scale, net worth, or other categories—as is done in this study. With
heterogeneous commodity groups like “vegetables” or “fruits,” differen-
ces between categories may result from the type of crop cultivated rather
than the variable of interest.
3  Since the unit of analysis used in this study is the commodity “enter-
prise,” rather than the whole farm operation, the same operation may
appear more than once in a table if that operation produces more than one
of the commodities considered.Key Agricultural Contracting and the Scale of Production   257
Table 1. Tests of Equal Mean Enterprise Value of Production for Contract and Independent
Operations: All Farms and Those with Value of at Least $250,000 (1996S S S S2000)










































































































Notes: All data are from the 1996S2000 ARMS (USDA/ERS) unless noted. Observations are weighted to account for survey design.
a The t-statistic corresponds to the test of the null hypothesis of equal means.
b Information for 1998S2000 only.
The qualitative results presented in the study were
not sensitive to the cutoff values between 40% and
60% of production (more extreme cutoff values
were not tried). The left-hand side of table 1 presents
a test of equal mean value of production for all pro-
ducers. On average, scale is observed to be much
larger for contract production as compared to inde-
pendent production for all six commodities. In terms
of average scale, contract production ranges from
about 50% larger than independent production for
the case of wheat, to over 3,000% larger for cattle.
The right-hand side of table 1 tests whether a
relationship between scale and contracting exists
for large-scale commercial producers. The table
presents a test of equal mean value of production
for those farms producing more than $250,000 of
the commodity.
4 Contract growers of livestock are
shown to have much larger average values of pro-
duction than do independent livestock producers.
For field crops, the scale difference between
contract and independent production is smaller—
corn and soybeans are produced at a significantly
larger scale under contract, though the difference is
small. For large-scale commercial producers of
wheat and cotton, there is no significant difference
in scale between contract and independent producers.
Another way of viewing the relationship between
scale and contracting is to compare the probability
density functions of the value of enterprise produc-
tion for contract and independent producers. Figure
1 presents estimates of these density functions for
the same commodities analyzed in table 1. Density
functions are estimated using a kernel density esti-
mator with the bandwidth chosen by Silverman’s
“rule of thumb” (Silverman, 1986).
5 Because the size
distribution is skewed, the density is estimated for
the log of the value of production. Figure 1 shows
large differences in the size distributions of contract
and independent producers of cattle and hogs.
4  Because farms often produce more than one commodity, almost all
commercial farms included in this analysis have a total farm value of
production well above $250,000—a value frequently used to distinguish
“large” from “small” farms (Hoppe and MacDonald, 2001).
5  The algorithm used disperses the mass of the empirical distribution
function over a regular grid of at least 512 points and then uses the fast
Fourier transform to convolve this approximation with a discretized ver-
sion of the kernel. A linear approximation is used to evaluate the density
at the specified points [see Venables and Ripley (1999) for details].258   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Figure 1. Estimated probability density functions for crop value of productionKey Agricultural Contracting and the Scale of Production   259
Figure 1. (continued)
Source: 1996S2000 ARMS (USDA/ERS)260   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review































































































































Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. All data are from the 1996S2000 ARMS (USDA/ERS) unless noted. Observations are
weighted to account for survey design.
a Information for 1998S2000 only.
There are smaller differences between the size distri-
bution of contract and independent producers of the
remaining commodities. However, for every com-
modity, the density function mass for contract pro-
ducers is clearly to the right of that for independent
producers.
Finally, the relationship between scale and con-
tracting can be examined by comparing the rate of
contracting for different size producers. Table 2
reports the percentage of farms that contract for
each value-of-production quintile. Contracting
becomes increasingly common in proportion to the
value of production, i.e., farms in larger quintiles are
more likely to use contracts than farms in smaller
quintiles. This relationship holds for all commodities
and quintiles except for wheat between the second
and third quintiles. This relationship is statistically
significant for many size-commodity comparisons.
Focusing on the largest 40% of producers, the
reported standard errors indicate there is a large and
statistically significant increase in the rate of con-
tracting between the second largest and the largest
value-of-production quintiles for all commodities
except wheat and cotton.
In sum, the evidence suggests that contracting is
positively associated with scale of production for
all six major commodities. This relationship persists
for large-scale producers of all commodities except
wheat and cotton, and is strong for large-scale
producers of cattle and hogs. In the next section, six
possible mechanisms are presented to explain this
relationship.
Mechanisms and Evidence
Many marketing and production contracts have been
shown to significantly reduce grower income risk
(Johnson and Foster, 1994; Knoeber and Thurman,
1995; Martin, 1997). In general, marketing contracts
shift output price risk to contractors, and production
contracts shift both output and input price risk to
contractors.
6 Production contracts also can reduce
6  Some marketing contracts may shift little or no risk from growers to
contractors. For example, if growers are uncertain of their output, then
marketing contracts requiring growers to deliver a fixed quantity of a
commodity may be risky. This risk occurs because farmers who cannot
meet their contractual obligations must purchase the balance of the
commodity owed in the market. Farmers usually minimize this risk by
contracting only a portion of their expected harvest. A second example is
a marketing contract that ties the contract price to an unknown future
market price. Farmers can eliminate most of their risk in this situation by
buying and selling futures contracts. Finally, some marketing contracts
simply guarantee market access with no effect on price risk.Key Agricultural Contracting and the Scale of Production   261
Figure 2. Imperfect capital markets mechanism
some yield (production) risk for growers, depending
on the contract’s incentive structure. The fact that
contracts shift risk from growers to contractors is
important for the first and fourth mechanisms dis-
cussed below.
Imperfect Capital Markets
Asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders about the quality or riskiness of borrowers’
investments can lead to adverse selection and moral
hazard costs for lenders. If expenditures on capital
investments are not perfectly observable by lenders,
then borrowers (farmers) may be tempted to divert
funds to risky uses because they can earn higher
expected returns. If borrowers face limited liability,
they face less downside risk compared to lenders,
but stand to gain more on the upside. Hence, bor-
rowers and lenders have a different set of incentives.
This is not a problem if the lender can perfectly
observe the use of the loan, but if information is
imperfect, lenders will face greater costs associated
with a risk of default and monitoring. Lenders will
require a higher return to compensate for these
higher costs and may ration credit to borrowers
(e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Lenders will have
an incentive to charge interest rates that increase in
proportion to the amount of the loan not secured by
the borrowers’ net worth.
Based on Hubbard (1998), a graphical analysis is
used to illustrate the market for capital under im-
perfect information. Figure 2 illustrates the demand
for capital by a firm (in this case a farm) and the
supply of funds to the firm. The demand curve D
slopes downward, suggesting a higher cost of capi-
tal reduces the desired capital stock. For simplicity,
let the demand for capital by independent farms
equal the demand for capital by contracting farms,262   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Mean Debt-to-Net Worth Ratio by Net Worth Quintile, 1996S S S S2000
NET WORTH QUINTILE
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Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. All data are from the 1996S2000 ARMS (USDA/ERS). Observations are weighted to
account for survey design. 
implying both face equal investment opportunities:
DI(r) = DC(r).
A farm can self-finance if its desired capital
stock is less than its net worth (W0). Consequently,
for capital stock smaller than W0, the supply curve
(S) is horizontal at the opportunity cost of capital
rate (r)—consistent with the neoclassical invest-
ment model. If a farm wants to increase its capital
stock beyond its net worth, it must borrow. The
slope of the supply curve reflects the information
costs of the uncollateralized finance: the higher the
marginal information costs for the lender, the steeper
the supply curve (Hubbard, 1998, p. 197).
The equilibrium for the farm is the point where
the farm’s demand curve intersects the supply curve.
In figure 2, an independent (non-contracting) farm
has a capital stock KI. Now consider how a contract
changes the supply curve in figure 2. For simpli-
city, assume a contract lowers the risk associated
with investment, but does not change expected farm
profits. Less risk means lower information costs for
lenders, so the supply curve becomes less steep—
banks are willing to lend more for the same interest
rate. Hence, under contract, borrowing increases,
which corresponds to an increase in the capital
stock from KI to KC.
The lower quadrant in figure 2 illustrates the
value of production on the Y-axis as a function of
capital. A larger capital stock implies more produc-
tion, and consequently a greater value of production.
Thus, the imperfect capital market mechanism
explains why, given the same net worth, contract
operations have a greater value of production. If a
processor locates in a particular area and randomly
selects farmers with whom to contract, then contract
and independent farmers should have about the same
net worth, on average. The mechanism maintains
that, with the same net worth, farmers who contract
can borrow more and therefore produce more than
farmers who are independent. Hence, it follows that
contract operations will have a greater scale of pro-
duction, on average, than independent operations.
The imperfect capital market mechanism results
in two testable implications: (a) for a given net
worth, contract operations will have greater debt
(and therefore greater capital assets); and (b) for a
given net worth, contract operations will have
greater value of production. Table 3 compares the
debt-net worth ratio for contract and independent
producers of various commodities in each net worth
quintile. For almost every net worth quintile in
every commodity considered, the debt-net worth
ratio is significantly larger for the contract farms
compared to independent farms.
7 Table 4 compares
the value of production-net worth ratio for contract
and independent producers of various commodities
in each net worth quintile. Again, for most com-
modities—and especially for livestock—there is a
strong positive relationship between contracting
and the value of production-net worth ratio. Hence,
7  Table 3 also shows a decline in the debt-net worth ratio as the net
worth increases, implying a larger share of farm finance comes from own-
wealth, as wealth increases. This result neither confirms nor contradicts
the imperfect capital market mechanism.Key Agricultural Contracting and the Scale of Production   263
Table 4. Mean Value of Production-to-Net Worth Ratio by Net Worth Quintile, 1996S S S S2000
NET WORTH QUINTILE
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Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. All data are from the 1996S2000 ARMS (USDA/ERS). Observations are weighted to
account for survey design. 
the information in tables 3 and 4 supports the test-
able implications that debt and value of production
are greater for contract operations compared to
independent operations, holding net worth constant.
The results obtained here are consistent with a
study by Barry et al. (1997) which demonstrated
that lenders respond to the risk-return tradeoff
between independent and contract hog production
by providing greater borrowing capacity to contract
producers.
8 The authors surveyed 62 lenders to find
out how much, and under what terms, they would
lend to four representative types of producers: small
and large low-risk contract operations and small
and large high-risk independent operations. The
study found that most lenders approved a higher
proportion of the loan request and/or offered a lower
interest rate to the contract operations, resulting in
a higher debt-asset ratio for large-scale contract
growers compared to large-scale independent grow-
ers (the resulting debt-asset ratio was approximately
the same for the small operations). The results are
also consistent with the assumptions of Boehlje and
Ray (1999) who maintained contract growers can
take on more debt than independent growers because
contract growers face less risk. Contract growers in
that study, because they operated with greater debt
and at a larger scale, earned a higher return on equity
than independent growers.
Contractor’s Fixed Transaction Costs
Contract operations may be larger than independent
operations because contractors find it more profit-
able to contract with larger-scale operations. When
presented with a portfolio of farms of different sizes
with whom to contract, contractors may choose to
contract with larger operations in order to minimize
some contracting transaction costs. Some important
transaction costs for a contractor (e.g., an agricul-
tural processing firm or its intermediary) include
costs associated with: search for and screening of
clients; negotiation of contracts; transfer of goods,
services, or property rights; monitoring behavior for
breach of contract; and enforcement of contract
terms (e.g., Allen and Lueck, 2003; Foss, Lando,
and Thomsen, 2000; Shelanski and Klein, 1995;
Williamson, 1979). A contractor’s transaction costs
are often fixed costs that do not depend on the scale
of production of the contracting farm. For example,
an on-farm visit by a contractor may require the
same amount of time regardless of the size of the
farm. A contractor can reduce fixed transaction
costs by reducing the number of contract agents and
raising the average scale of production for each
agent.
Because production contracts are generally much
more complex than marketing contracts, and often
require contractors to provide management and tech-
nical assistance in addition to inputs, it is reason-
able to assume that production contracts impose
higher transaction costs on contractors than do
marketing contracts. Accordingly, the contractor’s
8  Barry et al. (1997) also show that for a given level of output, contract
operations require smaller loans than the independent operations because
contract producers do not need to finance “operating” and “feed system”
costs. This point is emphasized in our discussion of the “input-leverage”
mechanism.264   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 5. Tests of Equal Mean Value of Production for Production Contract and Marketing
Contract Producers, 1996S S S S2000
Marketing Contract Production Contract
Commodity Mean ($) N  Mean ($) N t-Statistic Prob > |t|
 a
Cattle–All 183,032 435 1,369,700 227 !2.76 0.0060
Cattle–Feeder
 b 112,470 219    478,400   56 !2.03 0.0428
Cattle–Finished
 b 689,681   37 9,574,600   52 !2.51 0.0139
Hogs–All 399,717 126    497,952 970 !1.40 0.1604
Hogs–Feeder
 b 117,406   19    323,560 218 !2.39 0.0177
Hogs–Finished
 b 416,361   95    530,153 501 !1.54 0.1237
Notes: All data are from the 1996S2000 ARMS (USDA/ERS) unless noted. Observations are weighted to account for survey design.
a Prob > |t| is the two-tailed significance probability under the null hypothesis of equal means.
b Information for 1998S2000 only.
transaction costs mechanism implies the scale of
production under a production contract should be
larger, on average, than under a marketing contract.
To examine whether the survey data support this
implication of the transaction costs mechanism, we
first classify contract production as being produced
under a marketing or production contract (recall
that a commodity was defined as “produced under
contract” if more than 50% of the total value of
production was under contract). Now define a com-
modity as “produced under a market contract” if
more than 50% of the value of the commodity that
was produced under contract was produced under
a marketing contract. Otherwise, the contract-
produced commodity is defined as “produced under
a production contract.”
The weighted shares of production contracts in
all contracts for cattle, hogs, corn, soybeans, wheat,
and cotton were 40.6%, 83.1%, 1.3%, 4.2%, 0.3%,
and 0.03%, respectively. Cattle and hogs were the
only commodities for which growers used both
production and marketing contracts in sufficient
numbers to merit a statistical comparison. Table 5
reports tests of equal mean value of production for
production contracts versus marketing contracts.
Because different stages of cattle and hog produc-
tion could be correlated with the use of either pro-
duction or marketing contracts, table 5 disaggregates
cattle and hog production into “all,” “feeder,” and
“finished” (breeding and “other” types of livestock
production are not shown because they represent
such a small share of total production). For “all,”
“feeder,” and “finished” cattle, and for “feeder”
hogs, the value of production is significantly
greater under production contracts compared to
under marketing contracts. For all remaining cate-
gories, production contract producers operate at a
larger scale than do market contract producers, but
not significantly so. Hence the evidence is consistent
with the transaction costs mechanism. However, as
shown in the next section, the “input-leverage”
mechanism offers an alternative explanation for
why production is greater under production contracts
compared to marketing contracts.
Next, consider a second implication of the con-
tractor’s transaction costs mechanism. As noted
above, if contractors face significant contracting
transaction costs, they should prefer to contract
with larger-scale growers, holding the per unit
contract price (or fee) constant. However, it is
reasonable to presume that contractors would be
willing to bear the additional transaction costs
associated with contracting with smaller-scale
producers in exchange for paying a lower per unit
fee. If this were the case, then we would expect
larger-scale contract growers to earn relatively
higher per unit fees than smaller-scale contract
growers.
To test the implication of the “contractor’s trans-
action costs mechanism” that larger contract
operations earn higher per unit fees than smaller
operations, we compare the per unit contract fees
for different size operations that use production
contracts. Table 6 presents the fees as a share of
value of production for “feeder” hogs and “finished”
hogs—the two commodities for which we have a
sufficient number of observations to make scale
comparisons. As table 6 shows, there is no signif-
icant relationship between scale and “per unit” fees
for the largest 80% of producers. Production
contract fees averaged about 23% of the value of
“feeder” hog production, and about 14% of the
value of “finished” hog production. The smallest
quintile received significantly higher fees as shareKey Agricultural Contracting and the Scale of Production   265
Table 6. Mean Contract Fee as a Share of the Value of Production for Feeder and Finish
Production Contract Hog Producers by Value-of-Production Quintile, 1998S S S S2000
VALUE-OF-PRODUCTION QUINTILE

























Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. All data are from the 1998S2000 ARMS (USDA/ERS). Observations are weighted to
account for survey design. Value-of-production quintiles were computed separately for each type of hog produced.
of value of production for both types of production.
Hence, the evidence from hog production contract
fees provides no support for the contractor’s trans-
action costs mechanism.
Input Leverage
The input-leverage mechanism applies only to
production contracts, i.e., contracts requiring the
contractor to provide inputs to growers. Consider,
for example, production contracts to finish hogs.
Under the terms of a typical contract, a contractor
provides a large share of the “variable inputs”—
feed, feeder pigs, veterinary care, managerial assist-
ance, and marketing services. Growers provide
labor and “fixed inputs”—growing facilities, and
equipment. Growers are paid a fee for raising the
animals, which may be based on animal weight
gain, death loss, or feed productivity. Because
contractors provide most of the variable inputs
under a production contract, growers require far
fewer financial resources to produce a given quan-
tity of product. For example, the feed and other
inputs supplied by a contractor under a production
contract to finish hogs represents, on average, over
80% of the total costs of production (McBride and
Key, 2003). Hence, a grower with limited financial
resources could produce more under a production
contract than independently or under a marketing
contract (where inputs are not provided by the
contractor).
The input-leverage mechanism is illustrated
graphically in figure 3. The upper quadrant in the
figure illustrates the market for loans. Let the
demand for credit by an independent farmer be
given by DI. If the same farmer contracts, he or she
receives variable inputs from the contractor. Assume
these inputs have the value V. As a result, the farmer
demands a smaller loan at any interest rate, shown by
the demand curve DC located to the left of DI. The
bottom quadrant in the figure illustrates the value of
production as a function of the amount borrowed.
Note that for any loan amount, the contract opera-
tion can always produce more output than the inde-
pendent operation because the contract operation
receives variable inputs from the contractor. As
shown in figure 3, the value-of-production curve
for the contract operations PQ(V + B) is always
greater than the value of production for the inde-
pendent operation PQ(B).
Consider first a perfect capital market where
farmers can borrow an unlimited quantity at rate r,
as illustrated by the supply curve S1. The farmer
producing independently borrows BI
1, whereas the
farmer producing under contract borrows only
BC
1. The optimal scale for the farm is identical




Now consider an imperfect capital market where
the cost of capital increases with the amount
borrowed, as illustrated by the supply curve S2.
With the imperfect capital market, the independent
producer borrows BI
2 and the contract producer BC
2.
Because the contract producer has access to variable
input V from the contractor, the contract grower is
affected less by the capital market imperfection,
and the value of production drops less for the con-
tract producer compared to the independent pro-





identical conclusions would be reached if the
capital market imperfections resulted from capital
rationing. With rationing, the supply of capital would
be a vertical line at then only the B.I fB
1
C < B < B
1
I,
independent farmers would be rationed. If , B < B
1
C
then both contract and independent farmers would
be rationed. In either case, there would be a scale
effect from contracting.
The input-leverage mechanism predicts that for
a given level of financial resources (which can
be approximated by assets or debt), farmers using266   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Figure 3. Input-leverage mechanism
production contracts can obtain a larger scale of
production than can farmers using marketing
contracts or producing independently. If contractors
offered production contracts randomly to growers,
then those accepting contracts would have about the
same average access to financial resources as those
who did not, but production contracts would lever-
age these resources into greater output.
We observed in table 5 that farmers using pro-
duction contracts produced more output than those
using marketing contracts, which is consistent with
both the “contractor’s transaction costs” mechanism
and the “input-leverage” mechanism. The “input-
leverage” mechanism also implies more would be
produced under a production contract for a given
level of assets or a given level of debt. Specifically,
the average value of the production-asset ratio and
the production-debt ratio would be larger for
growers using production contracts compared to
marketing contracts. This is not a prediction of the
“contractor’s transaction costs” mechanism.
The left-hand side of table 7 reports tests of equal
mean value of production-assets ratio for produc-
tion and marketing contract production of cattle and
hogs for “all” producers (1996S2000), and “feeder”
and “finished” producers (1998S2000). For both
cattle and hogs, the average values of production-
net worth ratios are significantly larger for produc-
tion contracts compared to marketing contracts. The
right-hand side of table 7 presents similar informa-
tion, this time comparing the average value of
production-debt ratios. Hog producers who use
production contracts are able to leverage their debt
into greater production than can users of marketing
contracts. This relationship is less apparent for
cattle producers: for both feeder and finished cattle,
there is no significant difference in value of pro-
duction-debt ratios between the types of contracts.Key Agricultural Contracting and the Scale of Production   267
Table 7. Tests of Equal Mean Value of Production-Assets Ratio and Production-Debt Ratio for
Production Contract and Marketing Contract Producers, 1996S S S S2000










































































Notes: All data are from the 1996S2000 ARMS (USDA/ERS) unless noted. Observations are weighted to account for survey design.
a The t-statistic corresponds to the test of the null hypothesis of equal means.
b Information for 1998S2000 only.
In sum, the evidence generally supports the input-
leverage mechanism and suggests that the scale
differences in table 5 may be explained by the
input-leverage mechanism and the contractor’s
transaction costs mechanism.
Risk Aversion, Asset Specificity, and 
Technological Change
There are three additional mechanisms through
which contracting may affect scale, including
grower risk aversion, asset specificity, and techno-
logical change. Unfortunately, the data at our dis-
posal preclude testing these mechanisms in this
study. While these mechanisms are briefly discussed
in this section, empirical tests are left for future
work.
Risk Aversion. Under certain conditions, contracts
that shift risk from growers to contractors may
induce risk-averse growers to produce more, and
therefore operate at a larger scale than they would
have without a contract. Consider a simple market-
ing contract that reduces price variation without
altering the expected price. If there is only one
input to production, risk-averse farmers will
demand more of the input when under contract com-
pared to under independent production, resulting in
more output, all else equal (Sandmo, 1971). On the
other hand, a marketing contract may reduce the
variation in price, but also lower the expected price
for the grower. A lower expected price may induce
farmers to reduce the input, resulting in a net drop
in output despite the reduction in risk.
Production contracts may also influence the
optimal scale of production by shifting some (but
not all) production risk to contractors (Johnson and
Foster, 1994; Knoeber and Thurman, 1995; Martin,
1997). For example, hog contracts typically specify
a base payment per head, in addition to bonuses
that increase with feed efficiency and decrease with
death loss. Production contracts require farmers to
share some portion of the production risk to provide
an incentive for farmers to apply effort and care in
raising the animals and discourage diversion of
inputs provided by the contractor to other uses.
When growers share the product of their labor with
a contractor, growers receive less reward for their
effort than they would if they produced independ-
ently. Consequently, share contracts, while reducing
risk, may result in less grower effort, and therefore
less output. On the other hand, because a share con-
tract reduces risk, a contract could, under certain
conditions, induce risk-averse growers to provide
more effort than they would without a contract. In
the appendix, a simple principal-agent share contract
is used to demonstrate that a contract may increase
or decrease the optimal scale of production.
Asset Specificity. When production requires the
use of specific assets, contracting can result in a
larger scale of production. Asset specificity is the
extent to which the value of an asset is lost when it
is used outside of a certain context (Klein, Crawford,268   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
and Alchian, 1978; Riordan and Williamson, 1985;
Hart and Moore, 1988). Assets are specific if they
are located near or have physical characteristics
tailored to a particular purchaser. Examples of
specific assets include the specialized equipment
required for hog production such as manure storage
facilities, or equipment for manure handling, barn
ventilation, or delivering feed and water.
A farmer who makes a costly investment in a
specific asset is vulnerable to “hold-up”: a purchaser
with some degree of market power can lower his
offer price, driving the farmer toward his reser-
vation price. Often because of economies of scale
there is only one local purchaser of a product (such
as broilers or hogs), and transporting the product to
an alternative market is costly. Farmers vulnerable
to hold-up will be reluctant to invest in specific
assets, resulting in a smaller scale of production than
would otherwise be the case.
In addition to durable physical assets, the notion
of asset specificity also applies to short-term produc-
tion capital when a commodity becomes “tied” to a
particular purchaser because the product is perish-
able or costly to transport to alternative markets.
Farmers who grow commodities like fruits and
vegetables that lose value when not sold during an
optimal time period, or that are costly to transport,
may be vulnerable to hold-up—and would produce
less than they would otherwise. A contract can
overcome the market failure resulting from asset
specificity by guaranteeing a long-term market and
price for farmers’ output. A contract that specifies
a compensation scheme prior to an investment
reduces farmers’ risk of hold-up, and thereby
encourages more investment in specific physical
assets or production inputs, which can result in a
larger scale of production.
Technological Change. In some situations, con-
tracting may facilitate technological change which
allows operations to combine inputs in such a way
that average costs are minimized at a larger scale.
This is unlikely to occur in the case of marketing
contracts, i.e., whether or not a farmer uses a mar-
keting arrangement should have no direct effect on
the production technology. In contrast, production
contracts may influence the production technology.
For example, production contracts may provide
access to high quality proprietary inputs, such as
feed and genetic stock, which are not available for
purchase by independent producers. In addition,
contractors may provide managerial expertise to
growers that can improve productive efficiency.
Higher quality inputs and managerial expertise could
result in higher production with the same measur-
able inputs, resulting in a larger scale of production.
Indeed, Key and McBride (2003) found evidence
in the hog sector revealing the technology used
under production contracts differs significantly
from that under independent production. Using a
sample selection model to control for unobservables
correlated with the decision to contract and the pro-
duction technology, they concluded that contracting
results in about 20% more output, holding inputs
constant. Unfortunately, the data used in the present
study do not include information about the levels of
inputs used in production, ruling out an application
of the Key and McBride approach to cattle—the
other commodity examined here for which produc-
tion contracts are common.
Conclusion
This study has presented evidence that contracting
is positively associated with the scale of production.
Specifically, contract production tends to be at a
larger scale than independent production, and larger-
scale producers are more likely to use contracts than
smaller-scale producers. This relationship was most
striking in the cattle and hog sectors, where contract
producers operated at a much larger scale than did
independent producers, even when considering only
large-scale commercial operations.
Six possible explanations were also presented for
the observed correlation between scale and contract-
ing, using information from five annual national
surveys as evidence for or against the proposed
mechanisms. Evidence that contracting is correlated
with the debt-net worth ratio and the value of
production-net worth ratio lends support to the
“imperfect capital market” mechanism. Information
on how production contract fees vary with scale
fails to support the “contractor’s transaction costs”
mechanism. However, a comparison of the value of
production under production and marketing con-
tracts is consistent with both the “contractor’s trans-
action costs” and “input-leverage” mechanisms.
Finally, a comparison of the value of production-
net worth and value of production-debt ratios for
production and marketing contracts generally
supports the “input-leverage” mechanism. Survey
information was not used to test the validity of the
“grower risk-aversion,” “asset-specificity,” or “tech-
nological change” mechanisms.
The fact that the data are consistent with multiple
mechanisms suggests several of the proposed scale
mechanisms may be working simultaneously. TheKey Agricultural Contracting and the Scale of Production   269
proposed mechanisms are not mutually exclusive.
In fact, they are mutually reinforcing. For example,
a contract that reduces grower income risk may
increase the supply of credit available (imperfect
credit market mechanism) and simultaneously
induce risk-averse growers to take on more debt
(grower risk-aversion mechanism). A production
contract could “leverage” this additional borrowing
into even greater output by reducing growers’ finan-
cial costs of production (input-leverage mechanism)
and increase the efficiency of input use (techno-
logical change mechanism). Finally, if contracts
were only offered to large-scale producers, then all
the scale-enhancing effects associated with contract-
ing would be limited to large-scale producers
(contractor’s transaction costs mechanism). We
leave it to future work to disentangle the individual
contributions of these effects.
It is worth noting that scale differences between
contract and independent operations were greatest
in those commodities (cattle and hogs) where pro-
duction contracts are used relatively frequently. The
evidence presented in the study suggests several
possible reasons for this finding. First, unlike
marketing contracts, production contracts require
contractors to provide inputs to growers, effectively
leveraging growers’ financial resources. Second,
because production contracts have high fixed
transaction costs, contractors may be discouraged
from contracting with small-scale growers. Third,
because production contracts tend to be in effect for
a longer period of time than marketing contracts,
and because production contracts tend to shift more
risk to contractors than do marketing contracts,
lenders may be more willing to lend to growers
who have production contracts compared to mar-
keting contracts. Finally, production may raise the
quality of managerial and other inputs resulting in
greater productivity and scale.
It is also worth noting that there are substantial
differences across commodities in the structure of
contracts, implying contracting will influence scale
through different mechanisms. This is particularly
true for the case of cattle and hogs, where there are
significant differences in terms of animal owner-
ship, the rights to make management and marketing
decisions, and contract length. Cattle contracts are
often short-term, may specify multiple owners, and
delegate the management and marketing decisions
to feedlot managers. In contrast, hog contracts are
often multi-year contracts exclusive to one indi-
vidual, with the animal owner maintaining control
over management and marketing decisions. There
are also important differences between cattle and
hog production that can influence how contracts
affect scale. For example, the specificity of produc-
tive assets and the financial investment require-
ments are both higher in hog production relative to
cattle. There are also differences in the concentra-
tion of production over the animal’s life cycle—
production is more dispersed for finished hogs
compared to market cattle, while feeder pig opera-
tions tend to be more concentrated than cowherds.
This study has described several general mechan-
isms through which contracting might influence
scale. An understanding of the detailed character-
istics of contracts and production is important in
identifying how contracts influence scale for
individual commodities.
The evidence that contracting is positively asso-
ciated with scale of production casts doubt on the
importance of alternative theories which could
explain the relationship between scale and contract-
ing. For example, it has been hypothesized that
small-scale producers with lower income and
wealth are more risk-averse and less able to cope
with risk than larger-scale producers; thus smaller-
scale producers would be expected to place more
value on the risk-reducing property of contracts and
would therefore be more likely to contract (Key and
Runsten, 1999). It has also been suggested that
contractors may prefer to contract with smaller-
scale producers in part because the bargaining
strength of contractors is inversely related to the
scale of the contracting growers. According to this
argument, a contractor’s bargaining power may be
greater when there is a large number of smaller-scale
growers rather than a few large-scale growers,
because a smaller number of growers can more easily
organize themselves for collective action against the
firm.
9 In addition, smaller-scale producers probably
have more limited non-contract income and pro-
duction opportunities, which also strengthen a
contractor’s bargaining power. The fact that smaller-
scale producers are under-represented in contracting
suggests, in the United States at least, these alter-
native theories are less important in determining the
relative scale of contract production than the theories
elaborated in this study.
9  Smaller groups may be better able to organize because group mem-
bers internalize a larger share of the benefits of their own actions; they are
better able to observe the behaviors of other group members; communi-
cation among the group members is easier; members are more likely to
identify with the group; social sanctions may be more effective because
of tighter social ties; and transaction costs associated with governance are
smaller.270   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Finally, the results of this study point to the possi-
bility of a link between the recent consolidation of
agricultural production and the increased use of
contracts. Findings suggest contracting could have
allowed some farms to become bigger than they
would have otherwise. If there are economies of
scale in production, then by facilitating the expan-
sion of certain farms, contracting may enhance the
cost advantages of these operations and serve as a
catalyst for structural change.
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Appendix: Optimal Scale of Production
Illustration Using a Simple Principal-Agent 
Share Contract
To illustrate that a contract may have an ambiguous effect
on scale of production compared to independent produc-
tion, consider a simple principal-agent share contract. A
risk-averse agent (farmer) chooses how much “effort” (an
unobservable input) to apply to a risky production tech-
nology. In deciding how much effort to apply, the agent
makes a tradeoff between higher expected returns and the
certain loss of utility from using effort. Let farmer’s utility
increase in income w and decrease in effort e as follows:
agent’s utility = u(w)!g(e); uN > 0, uO < 0, gN > 0.
Also let the uncertain income from agriculture increase
linearly with effort: πe, where π is a random variable
over a finite range, The farmer’s expected π 0 [π,¯ π].
utility from independent production is therefore â =
Eu(πe)!g(e).Key Agricultural Contracting and the Scale of Production   271
Let there also be a risk-neutral principal (processor)
who cannot observe agent effort (cannot contract on
effort). The principal pays the agent a fixed certain pay-
ment f (which could represent the inputs to production
provided by the contractor) in exchange for a share (1!s)
of the agent’s uncertain profits. For any s, the principal
sets f so that the agent just receives her reservation utility
â. Given the terms of the contract, the agent chooses the
level of effort to apply to maximize utility. With an addi-
tively separable utility function, the agent’s problem is:
max
e
Eu(sπe) % f & g(e).
The first-order condition is:
(A1) E[uNsπ] & gN' 0.
Totally differentiating (A1) produces:
(A2) E[uOs2π2]de & gOde % E[uNπ]ds




' &E[uNπ] & E[uOsπ2e]
E[uOs2π2] & gO
.
The sign of (A3), which indicates how a change in the
contract share affects agent effort, is ambiguous (the sign
is ambiguous regardless of the sign of gO). If de/ds < 0,
then a contract that increases the share of agricultural
income going to the contractor (i.e., decreases s), induces
more effort from the grower, resulting in greater output.
When the sign of (A3) is negative, the positive output
effect from insurance outweighs the negative incentive
effect resulting from the sharing of output.
The first-order condition (A1) from which (A3) is de-
rived must hold in the special case where s = 1 and f = 0,
i.e., the case where a contract is equivalent to independent
production. Starting at this point, we have shown that
decreasing the share of agricultural income s that goes to
the farmer (while simultaneously increasing the fixed
payment f to maintain the grower’s reservation utility)
can induce more or less effort from the farmer, depending
on the sign of de/ds. Hence, risk-averse growers may
produce more or less under contract compared to what
they would as independent producers.